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I. INTRODUCTION
The struggle between intellectual property (iP) rights and innovation
has reached a crucial moment in this country. On one hand, IP rights
provide incentives for people to create artistic, literary, and technological
works, which benefit society. On the other hand, ongoing innovation has
brought us to a point where information has never been more accessible
and ideas have never been easier to share. Interestingly, many of the
protected creations would not exist but for cumulative innovations that at
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times can threaten IP rights (and the incentives they provide). In reality,
both schemes encourage creation of new goods, technologies, and art in
different ways.
Nowhere is this tension more palpable than on the Internet, where
digital technology and widespread adoption have made it simple and
inexpensive to copy, distribute, and display creative works to millions,
almost instantaneously. The ongoing $1 billion lawsuit between Viacom
and YouTube is the pinnacle of this conflict.' Viacom asserts, among other
contentions, that YouTube bears liability for direct and secondary
copyright infringement resulting from YouTube users' video uploads of
Viacom content.2 In response, YouTube invoked the protections afforded
by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) to defend its activities.3
The DMCA's Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act
(Section 512) provides a framework for limiting an Online Service
4Provider's (OSP) liability for a third party's infringing use of its service.
The Act also provides a means for content owners to remove the infringing
material from the OSP's Web site.5 Nonetheless, copyright owners
continue to pursue litigation against service providers as a means to prevent
third-party infringement.6
Large content owners frequently sue facilitators of copyright
infringement rather than pursuing individual infringers.7 Copyright holders
understand that many OSPs generate advertising revenue from page views
arising from users viewing copyrighted content.8 Content owners realize
shutting down an entire online network capable of facilitating infringement
is more effective at curtailing the amount of infringing material available
than targeting millions of individual users.9 These suits also attempt to shift
1. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages and
Demand for Jury Trial, Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 1:07-cv-02103, 2008 WL
2062868 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2008).
2. Id. at 23-28.
3. Defendants' Answer to First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 10,
Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 1:07-cv-02103, 2008 WL 2260018 (S.D.N.Y. May
23, 2008).
4. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (2006).
5. Id. § 512(c)(3).
6. See generally Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913
(2005); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); 10 Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F.
Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
7. Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement
Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1346 (2004).
8. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages and
Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 1, at para. 38.
9. Lemley & Reese, supra note 7, at 1349.
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the burden of discovering copyright infringement away from the copyright
holder and onto the OSP. 10
Traditional defenses to secondary infringement liability have withered
as a result of recent cases.'" Further, the strict framework of Section 512
struggles to fit as applied to new technologies. Indeed, the case history
raises confusing contradicting opinions about whether the DMCA's "safe
harbor" provides any protection at all. The resulting uncertainty for
entrepreneurs and innovators demands a more predictable framework to
reduce the inevitable confrontations between copyright owners and OSPs.
This Note addresses the need to clarify the roles of copyright holders
and innovative new services on the Internet, using Viacom v. YouTube as
an illustration. Part II describes the litigious history of copyright owners'
confrontations with innovative OSPs, highlighting the urgent need for
protections on both sides. It also introduces the safe-harbor provisions
provided in Section 512 of the DMCA. Part III proposes a solution for
notification that will limit the monitoring burden on copyright owners
while adequately protecting OSPs. Finally, Part IV discusses the need to
impose a knowledge requirement throughout the safe harbor.
II. BACKGROUND
In Viacom v. YouTube, the plaintiffs assert claims of direct
infringement, inducement of infringement, contributory infringement, and
vicarious infringement. 12 The realities of the Internet challenge traditional
notions of direct infringement. For instance, when sending data through a
server, the server will make a temporary copy in its own memory. Servers
that host third-party content pose a greater challenge since they, by
definition, store content more permanently, though the owner may have
had no part in determining whether the content infringes a copyright.
Section 512 addresses these issues effectively, 3 but fails to adequately
address more complicated secondary liability issues.
Under current law, the impact of the secondary liability claims on the
future of Internet innovation far exceeds the impact of the direct liability
claims. Copyright owners, like Viacom, rely on a line of cases that find
noninfringers liable for the infringing activities of third parties. The level of
10. See First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages
and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 1, at para. 6 (alleging that YouTube, in fact, has
shifted the burden of monitoring to copyright owners).
11. See discussion infra Section II.C.
12. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages and
Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 1, at paras. 48-97.
13. Section 512 specifically protects service providers engaging in transmission,
cacheing, hosting user content, and linking. 17 U.S.C. § 512.
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involvement necessary for liability has evolved over time and through
legislation like the DMCA.
A. What is Secondary Liability?
Nothing in the Copyright Act expressly provides for secondary
liability; instead, secondary liability is borrowed from patent law and
traditional tort-liability doctrines. Patent law expressly assigns liability for
contributory infringement on anyone who sells a component, "knowing the
same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement
of [a] patent.' 4
In the copyright arena, secondary liability arises from judicial
interpretation of the Copyright Act.' 5 Secondary liability has two
categories: contributory and vicarious liability. One contributorily infringes
by knowingly inducing, causing, or materially contributing to infringing
activities.' 6 Courts find vicarious liability when the defendant (a) receives a
direct financial benefit from infringement and (b) has the right and ability
to control that infringement.1 7 Recent secondary liability cases trace their
roots to the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc. 18
The Sony Court, noting the similarities between copyright and patent,
embraced the notion of contributory infringement, recognizing that
"vicarious liability is imposed in virtually all areas of the law, and the
concept of contributory infringement is merely a species of the broader
problem of identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold one
individual accountable for the actions of another."' 9 However, the Court
held that Sony bore no responsibility for the infringing actions of
consumers that purchased its Betamax Video Tape Recorder.20 Drawing on
themes from patent law, secondary liability arises only in instances where
the technology's sole use is for infringing purposes.2' Thus, sale of such
14. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006).
15. As far back as 1911, courts have recognized liability for a noninfringing party.
Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911) (finding defendant liable for selling motion
picture to others who later displayed the work in violation of the copyright).
16. Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971).
17. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005)
(citing Shapiro, Bernstein, & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963)).
18. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
19. Id. at435.
20. Id. at 456.
21. See id. at 440-42.
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"dual-use" technologies-those with substantial noninfringing uses-does
not result in liability for the producer under the Sony doctrine22.
While Sony appeared to provide a significant defense for new
technologies that have the potential to be abused to infringe copyright, the
dual-use defense did not gain much traction in the Internet age. Courts
continued to find peer-2-peer (P2P) file-sharing services secondarily liable
for users' copyright infringement. Until recently, neither a dual-use defense
nor the new DMCA safe-harbor provisions generally provided any
reprieve.
B. Secondary Liability in the Peer-2-Peer (P2P) Context
The rise of P2P file-sharing services triggered much of the litigation
involving allegations of contributory and vicarious copyright infringement
in the online environment. The P2P line of cases began in the Ninth Circuit
with the music industry's case against Napster, followed in the Seventh
Circuit against Aimster, and finally culminating in the Supreme Court with
Grokster.23
1. Napster and the Limits of Substantial Noninfringing Uses24
Many people remember Napster as the first mainstream software
utilized to trade copyrighted music files among users. A user logged into
the Napster software, searched for a song, and was connected to another
user's computer, which would then transfer the song to the searcher's
computer.25
Rather than pursuing individual users of the service, music copyright
owners sued Napster itself for contributory and vicarious copyright
infringement.26 Napster asserted that it was protected from liability due to
"substantial noninfringing uses" under the Sony doctrine.27 However, the
court failed to extend a shield of liability to Napster based on that
assertion. Instead, the court concluded that Sony applied only to the extent
that a party may not have constructive knowledge of infringement if its
22. Roland L. Trope, The Lessons of MGM v. Grokster, IEEE SPECTRUM, Jan. 2006,
http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/internet/the-lessons-of-mgm-v-grokster
23. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); In
re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
24. For an in-depth discussion, specifically about P2P issues, see Lemley & Reese,
supra note 7, at 1354-65.
25. Jeff Tyson, How the Old Napster Worked, HowSTuFFWoRKS,
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/napster2.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2009).
26. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004.
27. Id. at 1020.
28. Id. at 1021.
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product is capable of noninfringing uses. 29 The court noted that, even had
the Napster software been capable of substantial noninfringing uses,
Napster had actual and constructive knowledge of direct infringement
proven through other means.30 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held the Sony
doctrine of "substantial noninfringing uses" only protects an OSP if the
plaintiff cannot prove actual or constructive knowledge of infringement
through other means.
The court also found Napster vicariously liable for the infringement of
its users.3' It held that Napster received a direct financial benefit because
"the availability of infringing material 'act[ed] as a "draw" for
customers."'' 32 Further, the right conferred by its terms of service to
terminate users for any reason, including for violation of law, established a
duty to exercise the right to police the network to its fullest extent.33 The
court noted that both Napster and the copyright holders had access to the
software's search function.34 Accordingly, Napster's failure to search for
files (which content owners had previously brought to Napster's attention)
was a failure to fully exercise its duty to police its network. 35 As a result,
Napster had received a direct financial benefit for infringing activity that it
had the right and ability to control and was, thus, vicariously liable for that
infringement. It is important to notice, however, that Napster's duty to
search for infringing files did not arise until content owners established that
their work was available on the network.36
The Napster decision effectively declared the Sony noninfringing-use
defense invalid in the Ninth Circuit in cases where a software provider
clearly knew of the infringement and had the ability to control the illegal
activity.
2. Aimster and the Refraining of Sony
The Aimster decision seemed to relax the harsh requirements imposed
by the Napster court on software providers. Aimster facilitated transfer of
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1020. For instance, the record included a memo written by cofounder Sean
Parker that mentioned "the need to remain ignorant of users' real names and IP addresses
'since they are exchanging pirated music."' Id. at 1020 n.5 (quoting A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 114 F.Supp.2d 896, 918 (N.D.Cal. 2000)).
31. Id. at 1023-24.
32. Id. at 1023 (quoting Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 263-64
(9th Cir. 1996)).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1024.
35. Id.
36. See id. at 1027.
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files over widespread Instant Messaging (IM) platforms.37 An Aimster user
could only search the files shared by other users that had been added to her
friend list.3 8 The file could then be sent from a friend's computer to the
user's computer over the IM network.39
The Seventh Circuit Court in Aimster noted that the Aimster software
was certainly capable of noninfringing uses, like the Napster software and
the Sony Betamax.40 However, Judge Posner pointed out that the Betamax
had demonstrable noninfringing uses, and that none of its advertisements
encouraged infringing use of the product.4' Aimster, on the other hand,
presented no evidence of any actual noninfringing use of the service, and
its tutorial explicitly provided examples of the service being used to share
copyrighted music.
42
Even if Aimster showed examples of noninfringing use of its service,
the court implied that more would still be needed to avoid liability. A
service provider like Aimster would need to show that eliminating or
reducing infringement would impose a disproportionate cost on the
provider or that such elimination would hinder the noninfringing uses of
the service.4 3 The Sony Court never contemplated this additional
requirement in its analysis.
By outlining a means to avoid liability, the Seventh Circuit's Aimster
decision represents a more favorable view of dual-use technologies, but it
still limits the application of the Sony doctrine. Still, the decision seemed to
extend the notion from Napster to the Seventh Circuit that simply being
capable of noninfringing use is not sufficient to shield an OSP from actual
or constructive knowledge of infringement, lending the proposition greater
weight.
3. Grokster and Inducement of Infringement
In the only Supreme Court case on the subject of P2P file sharing,44
the Court extended contributory liability to include "inducement" of
infringement. Grokster differed from prior P2P services in that the network
was decentralized-meaning the lists of available files were maintained on
individuals' computers rather than in a central database under Grokster's
37. Sue Zeidler, Aimster Says to Run with Microsoft, Yahoo Messaging, REUTERS, Dec.
19, 2000.
38. Id. See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir. 2003).
39. Id.
40. See id. at650-51.
41. Id. at 651 (citing Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 438, 458-59
(1984)).
42. Id.
43. See id. at 653.
44. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
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control. Users searched and downloaded material with no involvement by
the software providers.45 The defendants' only involvement in the
infringement was initially supplying the software.46 The Court found the
defendants contributorily liable, not because of an actual knowledge of
copyright infringement, but because they induced users to commit
copyright infringement.47 Thus, an OSP cannot escape liability for third-
party infringement if it induces users to utilize the service to commit
copyright infringement.
C. The DMCA 's Safe Harbors and the Liability of OSPs
The rise of the Internet brought with it additional challenges for
determining liability for third-party infringement. Noting copyright law's
struggle to keep pace with emerging technology, Congress foresaw a
continued struggle with online services.48 Congress further sympathized
with online service providers' desire for legal clarity in this area.4 9 With
these concerns in mind, Congress set forth two purposes in enacting
Section 512. First, Congress sought to "preserve[] strong incentives for
service providers and copyright owners to cooperate to detect and deal with
copyright infringements that take place in the digital networked
environment." 50 Second, Congress sought to "provide[] greater certainty to
service providers concerning their legal exposure for infringements that
may occur in the course of their activities."'"
The resulting legislation included a safe harbor for an OSP hosting
infringing user content. To be eligible, the OSP must meet a set of
threshold requirements and must not violate the "personal knowledge and
gain" requirements of Section 512(c).52
1. Section 512(i) Threshold Requirements
Service providers storing and making available content at the
direction of a third party, such as YouTube, must satisfy two basic
thresholds to be eligible for the safe harbor. First, the OSP must adopt and
implement a policy for terminating repeat infringing subscribers.53 Next,
the OSP must accommodate and refrain from interfering with standard
45. Id. at 928.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 936-37, 940.
48. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 2 (1998) available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=105_congreports&docid=fsrl90.pdf.
49. Id. at 19.
50. Id. at 20.
51. Id.
52. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006).
53. Id. § 512(i)(1)(A).
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technical measures used by copyright owners to identify or protect
copyrighted works.
54
A termination policy is reasonably implemented if the service
provider terminates users that repeatedly or blatantly infringe copyright.
55
If the OSP prevents copyright holders from notifying the OSP of
infringement, the policy is not reasonably implemented. 56 Failure to
reasonably implement a termination policy renders an OSP ineligible for
Section 512 safe harbors,57 but there seems to be no requirement that a
termination policy keeps users from re-registering in order to be considered
reasonable.
Apparently seeing the inherent difficulty in determining whether a
particular technical measure is "standard," Congress provided a definition
in the DMCA. In order to qualify as a threshold requirement, the DMCA
requires that technical measures must (1) be "developed pursuant to a broad
consensus of copyright owners and service providers in an open, fair,
voluntary, multi-industry standards process; '' 18 (2) be freely "available to
any person on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms;"5 9 and (3) impose
neither substantial costs nor substantial burdens on OSP systems or
networks.6 °
2. Personal Knowledge and Gain
If an OSP meets the threshold requirements, it is shielded from
liability as long as the OSP (1) "does not have actual knowledge that the
material or an activity using the material on the system ... is infringing"
6
'
and (2) "does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the
infringing activity," where the OSP "has the right and ability to control
. 162
such activity.
Applying the first test, which will henceforth be referred to as the
personal-knowledge test, courts have long held that it is the responsibility
of the copyright owner to make a service provider aware (i.e., provide
54. Id. §§ 512(i)(1)(B), (i)(2).
55. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBiIl LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1109-10 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing
Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1102-03 (W.D. Wash. 2004)).
56. See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 659 (N.D. I11. 2002).
57. Id.
58. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2)(A) (2006).
59. Id. § 512(i)(2)(B).
60. Id. § 512(i)(2)(C).
61. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i).
62. Id. § 512(c)(1)(B).
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actual knowledge) of any infringing content on its system. This typically
has been accomplished by sending DMCA "take-down" notices.63
The take-down provision of Section 512 permits copyright owners to
notify OSPs that an infringing work is available on the copyright owner's
Web site.64 Upon receipt of a compliant notice, the OSP must "respond
expeditiously" and remove, or disable access to, the infringing material.65
Personal knowledge can also arise from an OSP's "aware[ness] of
facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent" 66-the
so-called red-flag test. To date, no OSP has failed the stringent red-flag
test, which requires a determination "whether the service provider
deliberately proceeded in the face of blatant factors of which it was
aware."6 7 It is hard to imagine a situation where an OSP that complies with
DMCA take-down notices would have sufficient apparent knowledge to
have "turned a blind eye to 'red flags' of obvious infringement.,
68
The second hurdle-the personal-gain test-presents the most
troubling aspect of Section 512. This provision closely mirrors the test for
vicarious liability, permitting a court to impute liability on an OSP if it
receives a financial benefit directly attributable to infringing activity that
the OSP has the right and ability to control. This presents two troubling
issues. First, since the language of the personal-gain test essentially
requires that the OSP not vicariously infringe to qualify for the safe harbor,
the DMCA provides safe harbor only for direct and contributory liability.
Compounding the problem, the DMCA specifically requires an OSP to
have the right and ability to control infringement through a user-
63. See, e.g., ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmty.'s, Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir.
2001) (showing plaintiff's pre-trial letter substantially complied with DMCA notification
requirements); see also Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004)
(describing a DMCA-compliant letter that was sent); but cf Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com,
Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1107-08 (W.D.Wash. 2004) (showing that lack of a DMCA-
compliant notice, Amazon was not actually aware of infringement); 10 Group, Inc. v. Veoh
Networks, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (depicting plaintiff's failure to notify
defendant of any claimed copyright infringement implies no actual knowledge of alleged
infringing activity).
64. This written notification must include (1) a physical or electronic signature of a
person authorized to act on behalf of a copyright owner; (2) identification of the allegedly
copyrighted work; (3) the location of the infringing material on the OSP's site; (4) the
complaining party's contact information; (5) a statement that the complaining party is acting
in good faith in requesting take down on infiingement grounds; and (6) a statement, under
penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the copyright
owner. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) (2006).
65. Id. § 512(c)(1)(C).
66. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).
67. Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1108 (W.D.Wash. 2004)
(quoting 3 MELVILLE V. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, §
12B.04[A][I], at 12B-49).
68. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 42 (1997)).
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termination policy. 69 Coupled with the obvious financial gain most OSPs
enjoy through advertisements that may appear on pages containing
infringing material, OSPs are faced with a predicament. Full compliance
with the personal gains provision-strictly construed-would necessarily
require an OSP to police all user activity and determine, on its own, which
user-generated content infringed another's copyright.7° In the second
appeal decision, the Napster court held that a user-termination policy,
which requires ambitious searching for copyrighted material, is a
requirement to qualify for DMCA safe harbors. 71 But, in that case, the
search requirement "applie[d] only to copyrighted works which plaintiffs
have properly noticed. 72 No court has yet rested on the strict reading that
an OSP fails the personal gains test if any infringing material, whether or
not it has been notified that content is copyrighted. To rely on that reading
would render the DMCA safe harbors ineffective for any Web site that
brought in advertising revenue.
D. The DMCA 's Ineffectiveness for P2P Services
Grokster dealt specifically with the definition of contributory liability
and did not address the protections of the DMCA.73 Facing liability for the
infringement by users of its services, however, Napster and Aimster each
asserted eligibility for safe-harbor protection under the DMCA.74 The safe
harbors would shield the service providers from liability despite a finding
of contributory or vicarious infringement.75 For various reasons, these
claims were dismissed with little analysis.
1. Falling Short of the Threshold: Aimster
The Seventh Circuit refused to extend protection to Aimster under the
DMCA.76 While Aimster fit the definition of an OSP, it failed to meet the
threshold requirements to qualify for safe-harbor protection.77 The court
held that by encouraging infringement, Aimster failed to implement a
policy to terminate repeat infringers-instead inviting infringement through
69. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A) (1999).
70. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2002)
(holding "[t]o avoid liability for vicarious infringement, Napster must exercise this reserved
right [to terminate users' access to the system] to police the system to its fullest extent.").
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
74. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1025; In re Aimster
Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2003).
75. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1025; In re Aimster
Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2003).




the service.78 Since it did not have a reasonably implemented termination
policy, Aimster failed to fulfill the threshold requirements and was, thus,
not entitled to safe harbor from its contributory infringement. 79 The court
never reached the tests outlined in Section 512(c) because Aimster failed to
meet the basic threshold requirements for safe harbor.
2. The Extended Knowledge Requirement: Napster
The appellate court upheld the injunction on Napster due to the
likelihood of success on contributory and vicarious liability grounds despite
the prospect of DMCA safe-harbor protection. The court held that the
DMCA, on its face, did not prohibit a finding of secondary infringement on
the part of Napster. s°
The content owners challenged the requirement that they provide file
names to Napster of infringing content before Napster had a duty to
search. 81 The court, however, found it appropriate that content owners
provide notice of infringement before the service provider inherited a duty
to police its network for that content.8 2 In doing so, the court seemingly
extended a notice and knowledge requirement to vicarious liability.
83
E. 10 Group v. Veoh-Changing Realities
The P2P cases largely deal with the Sony doctrine of substantial
noninfringing uses. They touch very little on the safe harbors provided by
Section 512(c).84 Where the defendants asserted Section 512 defenses, the
courts quickly dismissed them with little analysis. In more recent cases,
involving nonP2P dual-use services, the safe-harbor analysis has in fact
shielded OSPs from secondary liability. The most recent and analogous
case to Viacom v. YouTube is 10 Group v. Veoh Networks, Inc. 5
In the Veoh case, a copyright owner brought suit against the video-
upload site Veoh.com for contributory and vicarious liability arising from
uploaded videos.8 6 Veoh asserted that its activities were protected under the
safe-harbor provisions of Section 512.87 Like the plaintiffs in YouTube, 10
Group sought a decision that Veoh
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004,1025 (9th Cir. 2001).




85. 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
86. Id. at 1135-36.
87. Id. at 1135.
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[did] not qualify for safe harbor under Section 512(c) because (a) the
materials in question were not stored on Veoh's system at the direction
of a user; (b) Veoh was aware of apparent infringing activity; and (c)
Veoh ha[d] the right and ability to control the infringing activity and
obtain[ed] a direct financial benefit from such activities. 8
1. Files Stored at the Direction of a Third Party
Veoh utilized a process that converted video files uploaded by third
parties into a commonly used Flash format to ensure accessibility to
content provided on its site.89 10 Group claimed that this format shifting
meant that the storage was no longer "at the direction of a user," but rather
was storage of Veoh's own decision.9° The court looked to the intent of the
uploading party and found that the user initiated the automated process of
conversion. 91 Under Veoh, an OSP may utilize an automated process to
facilitate a third party's request to upload content without losing safe-
harbor protections.92
2. Actual or Apparent Knowledge of Infringing Activity
(Contributory)
The court easily answered in the negative whether Veoh had actual
knowledge of infringement, since 10 Group never provided notice that its
copyrighted works were accessible on the site.93 The court's refusal to
address the concerns from the P2P line of cases indicates that, for sites with
demonstrable noninfringing uses, the court will impute actual knowledge
only upon receipt of compliant take-down notices.94
The court further found that no red flags illustrated an apparent
knowledge of infringing activity; specifically, the court rejected the notion
that copyright registration alone provides constructive knowledge to an
OSP as to ownership of a given clip.95 The professional nature of the
infringing clips also failed to raise a red flag of obvious infringement. First,
the court noted that "with the video equipment available to the general
88. Id. at 1146.
89. Id. at 1139.
90. Id. at 1146.
91. Id. at 1147-48.
92. See, e.g., id.
93. Id. at 1148.
94. See id. at 1146, 1148. This assumption follows the findings in other non-P2P cases
requiring a failure to act upon receipt of actual notification from copyright owners to impute
actual knowledge of infringement. See, e.g., ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmty.'s, Inc., 239
F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir.
2004); but cf Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1107-08
(W.D.Wash. 2004); 10 Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal.
2008).
95. 10 Group v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d, 1148-49 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
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public today, there may be little, if any, distinction between 'professional'
and amateur productions. 96 Second, since the plaintiff never informed
Veoh of the infringement, there is no evidence to show that Veoh was even
aware of the clips, much less the professional production quality.97
Interestingly, the court also seems to indicate that other legal
obligations that might draw attention to a particular video clip do not create
apparent knowledge of infringement. For example, the federal requirement
that pornographic videos carry labels certifying that all actors are over
eighteen years of age did not raise a red flag. 98 The court reached this
conclusion even though Veoh was aware of the legal obligation.99
On a broader basis, the Veoh decision indicates that expeditiously
removing or disabling access to material found to be infringing, as required
under Section 512, mitigates any actual or apparent knowledge of
infringement."°° The court seemed to look favorably upon Veoh's readily
accessible link for copyright owners to flag protected material.10
3. Right and Ability to Control Infringement (Vicarious)
In its analysis of Veoh's potential vicarious liability, the court directly
addressed the concern that a strict reading of vicarious liability will always
implicate an OSP that meets the threshold requirements.'02 The court
clarified that "right and ability to control the infiinging activity" as it is
used in the DMCA "cannot simply mean the ability of a service provider to
block or remove access to materials posted on its website or stored on its
system.",10 3 Vicarious liability requires "something more" than the ability to
terminate users and remove infringing content.1°4
Indeed, under the Veoh interpretation, vicarious liability requires the
"right and ability to control" the "infringing activity," not the right and
ability to control the "system."'' 05 The court contrasts Veoh's right and
ability to control its system, but not the infringing activity, with Napster's
right and ability to control infringing activity. 1°6 The conclusions drawn by
the court do not seem to have much support, however. The Veoh court




100. Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii), (c)(1)(C).
101. See 1O Group v. Veoh Networks, Inc, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
102. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
103. Veoh, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1151 (emphasis and citations omitted).
104. Id. (citing Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1181-
82 (C.D. Cal. 2002)).
105. Id. (emphasis in original).
106. Id. at 1153.
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claims that "there is no evidence that Veoh can control what content users
choose to upload before it is uploaded."' °7 However, the Napster service
simply indexed the files users chose to share, exerting no more control than
Veoh over the content users selected.
The court instead seems to draw on Sony-like arguments. It asserts
that "[u]nlike Napster, there is no suggestion that Veoh aims to encourage
copyright infringement on its system,"'10 8 and that "unlike Napster (whose
index was comprised entirely of pirated material), Veoh's ability to control
its index does not equate to an ability to identify and terminate infringing
videos."109
The least-suspect justification for the finding of a lack of control over
infringement is that Veoh actively policed its system "to the fullest extent
permitted by its architecture."" 0 While the plaintiff argued that the post-
publication spot checks, past removal of copyrighted content, and
termination of offenders' accounts proved a right and ability to control
infringement, these measures in fact show that Veoh did not turn a blind
eye to blatant infringement." The court also dismissed, on policy grounds,
the plaintiff's contention that if Veoh cannot prevent all instances of
infringement on its site, then it must hire more employees or decrease its
operations to a manageable level1 12 Enforcing such a contention would
contradict an express purpose of the DMCA to "facilitate the growth of
electronic commerce, not squelch it."
113
Veoh departed from prior cases by tolerating a more active role for an
OSP under the Section 512 safe-harbor provisions. The court appeared to
take a subjective approach to evaluating a safe-harbor defense. It should be
noted that 10 Group, an adult-film production company, probably garnered
little sympathy from the court.
Still, this opinion mixes vicarious and contributory liability into an
overlapping combination of liability. The court imputed vicarious liability
only when it failed to implement a policy for learning about and dealing
with actual infringement. This seems to read some degree of a knowledge
requirement into the "right and ability to control" clause of the DMCA. It
frames the issue of vicarious liability as whether the OSP takes appropriate
steps to deal with copyright infringement that does take place. 14
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 10 Group v. Veoh Networks, Inc, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (emphasis
in original).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1150-51, 1153-54.
112. Id. at 1154.
113. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 105-190 at 1-2).
114. Veoh, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
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F. Viacom v. YouTube-Testing the Limits of Section 512(c) and
Veoh
The illustrative case, Viacom v. YouTube, shares much in common
with the recent Veoh decision. " YouTube and Veoh each provide an
online video repository with a mix of major content providers and third
parties supplying clips." 6 Both services utilize a similar automatic system
for converting files uploaded by third parties." 7 However, the YouTube
litigation departs substantially from the fact pattern presented in Veoh.
Most notably, Viacom maintains that hundreds of thousands of its
copyrighted clips are available on YouTube. 18 In comparison, 1O Group
alleged that clips from ten of its copyrighted films had been uploaded to
Veoh.com. 19 Further, Veoh dealt with clips that were posted on Veoh.com
for the first time;120 whereas, a major component of the YouTube litigation
centers on the posting of duplicate videos following a successful take-down
procedure. 12'
1. Files Stored at the Direction of a Third Party
Following existing precedent, there is not much question that
YouTube qualifies as a service provider storing content at the direction of a
third party. The process YouTube employs bears substantial similarity to
the process employed by Veoh. 122 If the New York District Court follows
the Ninth Circuit's lead, there will be no question YouTube qualifies as an
OSP for purposes of third-party content storage, even though the company
converts uploaded videos to a uniform format.
115. See e.g., Veoh, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
116. Id. at 1136 ("In addition to user-submitted content, users may also access videos
from Veoh's content partners"); First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief and Damages and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 1, para. 9 ("[YouTube] has...
entered into expensive licenses with certain providers of copyrighted content.").
117. Veoh, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1139; First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief and Damages and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 1, at para. 4.
118. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages and
Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 1, at para. 3 ("[A]s of March 13, 2007, Plaintiffs had
identified more than 150,000 unauthorized clips of their copyrighted programming on
YouTube").
119. Veoh, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1136.
120. Id. at 1136-37.
121. See First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages
and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 1, at para. 6.
122. Veoh, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1139; First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief and Damages and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 1, para. 4.
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2. Actual or Apparent Knowledge of Infringing Activity
(Contributory)
Viacom likely will fail to prove contributory infringement on the part
of YouTube in this case. Although the Veoh case involved a plaintiff who
had never notified the defendant of any infringement, the relevant holdings
still apply to cases where the plaintiff has previously notified the defendant
of infringement. The Corbis case, relied on heavily by Veoh, clarifies that
notices are not evidence of knowledge if the OSP acts expeditiously to
rectify the infringement upon receipt of that notice. 23 There is no evidence
that YouTube has failed to respond when put on notice of infringement on
its Web site.
Whether the generous disposition found in Veoh for apparent
knowledge will extend to YouTube remains to be seen. YouTube's alleged
propensity for rampant infringement has garnered at least some news
coverage. 124 Viacom further contends that "description terms and search
tags" using Viacom's trademarks litter the site with red flags. 125 These
accusations do not seem to have any specific support behind them.
However, it is unclear whether applying the quasi-Sony analysis that the
Veoh court appeared to embrace would help YouTube. While YouTube
garners enough legitimate, noninfringing uses, it is likely that the court will
shy away from imputing apparent knowledge of infringement without
additional proof.
3. Right and Ability to Control Infringement (Vicarious)
In light of the incredibly subjective methodology employed by the
Veoh court, YouTube's potential liability for vicarious infringement is
uncertain. The Veoh court considered a variety of factors in finding in favor
of the defendant video-upload site. First, it looked to whether the OSP
could do more than simply remove infringing materials and terminate
infringing users in its right and ability to control infringement. 126 Next, it
looked to the dubious factor of whether any control the OSP could exert
extended beyond the system to the actual infringing activity.'27 Finally, it
looked to whether the OSP put forth its best effort to curb infringement.
128
123. Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1108 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
124. See, e.g., Ben Charny, YouTube Shared User Data with Studio Lawyers,
MARKETWATCH, Oct. 20, 2006, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/youtube-tumed-over-
user-data-to-media-firm-lawyers (last visited Dec. 10, 2009) ("It's no secret that millions of
Internet users every day watch copyright-infringing video on YouTube.").
125. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages and
Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 1, at para. 37.
126. Veoh,586F. Supp.2dat 1152.
127. Id. at 1151.
128. See id. at 1153-55.
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These factors cannot lead to a predictable result in a complex situation like
that found in Viacom v. YouTube.
Uncertainty will remain until a solution that allows an OSP to
properly exercise its right and ability to control infringement is found. The
solution must address the concerns of all interested parties, and all OSPs
must be able to receive protection under Section 512 as a result of its
implementation.
III. LIMITING THE BURDEN AND ENHANCING COOPERATION-
NOTIFICATION THROUGH TECHNOLOGICAL CONTROL
MEASURES
The YouTube litigation represents the future of online copyright suits.
The Internet community is pursuing increased use of Web 2.0 and user-
generated content without looking back. Even the CIA and other
intelligence agencies, which traditionally provide information on only a
"need-to-know basis," have joined in with the new wiki-powered
Intellipedia. 129 This increasing proportion of third-party content requires a
practical solution for new OSPs and content owners alike. The problems
associated with the increase in third-party content can be addressed in three
ways: (1) requiring stronger user policies, (2) leaving the system in place
and taxing copyright infringement, or (3) implementing effective
technological barriers.
The first proposal, requiring stronger user policies, assumes that the
ability of a user to register anonymously prevents reasonable
implementation of a repeat-infringer termination policy. 130 One proposed
solution along these lines comes from a group of industry leaders,
including Viacom and Veoh, that developed the "User Generated Content
Principles."'131 It proposes blocking re-use of verified e-mail addresses.
132
Based on the ease with which an individual can register an anonymous e-
mail address, this seems like a weak proposition. In order for a policy like
129. Massimo Calabresi, Wikipedia for Spies: The CIA Discovers Web 2.0, TIME, Apr. 8,
2009, available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1890084,00.html.
130. See Veoh, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1143-44 (pointing, as an example, to the ease with
which 10's vice president created a Veoh account using a fictitious name and e-mail
address).
131. User Generated Content Principles, http://www.ugcprinciples.com/ (last visited
Dec. 10, 2009).
132. See id., where Principle 11 states
UGC Services should use reasonable efforts to track infringing uploads of
copyrighted content by the same user and should use such information in the
reasonable implementation of a repeat infringer termination policy. UGC Services
should use reasonable efforts to prevent a terminated user from uploading audio
and/or video content following termination, such as blocking re-use of verified
email addresses.
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this to work, a more identifiable means would be needed, such as
verification of a credit card. Unfortunately, therein lies the problem. Many
users either do not have a credit card or are wary of using that kind of
sensitive information simply to register for a social site. This could limit
the (purported) true intent behind a site like YouTube-to provide a
location for self-publication. 133 Further, groups such as the Electronic
Frontier Foundation (EFF) note that under existing DMCA procedures,
fair-use videos are taken down with little or no "fair use" analysis.'34 This
means that fair users could be blocked from re-registration if they chose not
to fight a take-down notice. Focusing on complete termination of repeat
infringers puts too many limits on both the illicit and noninfringing uses of
an OSP's service.
The second proposition, leaving the system as is and implementing a
tax-or compulsory license-scheme on infringing videos provides
incentives for OSPs to encourage users to infringe copyright. Since any
revenue will simply be split between the OSP and content owner, the OSP
has no incentive to encourage legal use of its system.
The third proposition, implementing effective technological barriers
to infringement, balances all the interests and works within the existing
scheme of Section 512. Qualification for safe-harbor protection under
Section 512 is already contingent upon accommodating standard technical
control measures. Copyright owners would like uploads of copyrighted
materials to be blocked before going live on the Web site. Innovators
(OSPs) seek security and predictability when rolling out a service that
could potentially be employed by third parties to infringe copyright. It is in
the best interest of both parties to avoid costly litigation.
A. Who bears the burden ofpolicing infringement?
In the online service setting, it must be the copyright owner. Even if
an OSP were capable of checking every single file uploaded, the OSP lacks
the knowledge necessary to effectively identify infringing videos. The
copyright owner controls three key pieces of information. First, of the
infinite number of videos, to which does he own the copyright? Second,
what rights does the copyright owner have in the expression, and who is
authorized to upload the content to a Web site like YouTube? Finally, since
the copyright owner knows the extent of the copyright, only the copyright
133. YouTube's tagline is "Broadcast Yourself." YouTube: BroadCast Yourself,
http://www.youtube.com (last visited Dec. 10, 2009).
134. Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint at 16, Lenz v.
Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008) ("[An OSP] can simply issue
takedowns for any video carte blanche as long as it believes it has the right generally to do
so, and think about fair use later, if the target of the notice sends a counternotice."). See
also 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(1).
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owner can properly adduce whether a particular upload is an illegal
infringement or a permissive fair use. Asking an OSP to become an expert
in all copyrights (or in YouTube's case, all copyrighted videos) is simply
impossible and impractical.
The DMCA notice requirements obligate the complainant to attest to
each key piece of information that only the copyright owner can reasonably
know. 35 Congress foresaw this issue and properly imposed the duty to
discover and notify on the content owner.' 36 It is important to keep in mind
that the costs of identifying cases of infringement can themselves be overly
burdensome on copyright owners. 137 These considerations provide the basis
for the proposed solution.
B. The Technical Requirements
Viacom's major issue arises from the difficulty associated with
staying current with repeated infringements of the same copyrighted
work. 38 YouTube has long provided a tool that prevents any user from
uploading the exact file that had previously been removed. 139 The tool
works by comparing the "hash"--a digital fingerprint of an uploaded file-
against a list of other hashes that correspond to files that have been
removed following a DMCA take-down notice. 140 Veoh employed an
equivalent mechanism. 141
1. Hash Values-Digital Fingerprints
Every file has a "hash value" associated with it which acts as a digital
fingerprint for the file.' 42 If any other user uploads the same file that had
135. See, ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmty.'s, Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2001);
see also Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004); but cf Corbis Corp. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1107-08 (W.D. Wash. 2004); 10 Group, Inc. v.
Veoh Networks, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
136. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(c)(1)(C), (c)(3).
137. For instance, Viacom has spent "tens of thousands of dollars a month" to hire a firm
to search YouTube's Web site for infringing clips. Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.
(YouTube Compel Case), No. C-08-80211, 2009 WL 102808, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14,
2009).
138. See First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages
and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 1, at paras. 6, 41.
139. Seeid. atpara. 41.
140. See id.; see also 10 Group v. Veoh Networks, Inc, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1143
(N.D. Cal. 2008).
141. Veoh, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1143.
142. Id.; see also United States v. Cartier, No. 2:06-cr-73, 2007 WL 319648, at *1
(D.N.D. Jan. 30, 2007) ("A hash value is a unique multi-character number that is associated
with a computer file. Some computer scientists compare a hash value to an electronic
fingerprint in that each file has a unique hash value.").
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previously been removed, it will match the hash value in the database and
the system will not allow the user to upload that file.
The problem, as the Complaint points out in the YouTube case, is that
the slightest change to a file will give it a new hash value and, therefore,
the digital fingerprint will not match the previously removed file's hash
value. 143 This problem has been examined and settled in the post-liability
hearing for a permanent injunction against Grokster.144 The court there
considered the possibility of creating an audio hash of a portion of a song,
then matching it to see if it fit a portion of an uploaded song, thereby
catching duplicate files with one second trimmed off the end. 145 This
technique, however, would only work for the exact same version of the
song-a hash created from a studio recording would not catch an uploaded
live version of the same song.146
2. Video Hashes-Difficulty
Video creates a new set of issues that are difficult to address with
simple hashing techniques. A video that has any slight modification will
return a different hash value, just as a slight modification to an audio file
results in a completely unique hash value. Even changing the size of a
video can lead to a new hash value, making hash matching an unattractive
method for matching repostings of removed videos.
Several companies are currently working on Digital Video
Fingerprinting systems that analyze video and determine whether it is a
duplicate of a video included in the OSPs database.1
47
Indeed, even YouTube recently rolled out a beta version of a video
fingerprinting software. 148 The specifics are not available, but the software
creates a digital fingerprint based on an infringing video and then checks
against files as they are uploaded for matches. 149 YouTube's system allows
a copyright owner to select what to do with matching files: block, promote,
or create revenue (assuming a partnership agreement with YouTube).150
143. See First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages
and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 1, at para. 41.
144. See Metro-Goidwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197
(C.D. Cal. 2007).
145. Id. at 1206.
146. Id. at 1206 n.7.
147. Id. at 1207.
148. YouTube: YouTube Video Identification Beta, http://www.youtube.com-
t/video id about (last visited Nov. 3, 2009); Nate Anderson, Filter This: new YouTubefilter
greeted by concerns over fair use, Ars Technica (Oct. 16, 2007)
http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2007/1 0/youtube-launches-beta-video-filter-digital-
rights-groups-shed-tear.ars (last visited Dec. 10, 2009).
149. Anderson, supra note 148.
150. YouTube: YouTube Video Identification Beta, supra note 148.
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C. Shortcomings of Current Video Fingerprinting Technology Use
The use of the digital video fingerprinting technology certainly
provides one part of the solution to the problem of resubmissions of
infringing video. As the methods get perfected and software moves from
beta to the full-release version, copyright owners can expect to see more
technological protection for their creative works.
However, the current incarnation falls short of perfection on several
grounds. First, there is no standard agreement between the content industry
and the OSPs. Second, the current system fails to address fair-use
considerations. Finally, and most importantly, the system removes the
copyright holder from the equation when deciding whether a particular
video infringes his copyright.
1. The Lack of a Clear Standard in Video Fingerprinting
Technology Will Result in a System that Is Not Administrable
Critics have already attacked the early incarnations of video
fingerprinting as requiring too much from copyright owners and presenting
an administrative nightmare. As columnist Nate Anderson noted, "[e]ven
content owners might turn out to be a bit wary [as] [t]he new system isn't
magic; it requires that copyright holders submit copies of every piece of
material that they want protected."' 51 YouTube's current system requires
submission of a high-quality digital copy of each work for which protection
is sought 152 -something nonpartner content owners may not want to do.
In addition, several software companies have released competing
video identification products. For example, Gracenote, a staple company in
audio recognition software, announced in early 2008 the "[m]ost
[a]dvanced [v]ideo [i]dentification . . . [p]latform."'53 Later that year,
Audible Magic announced a partnership with IBM to provide "[b]est-[i]n-
[c]lass" video fingerprinting. 54 Because of the number of technologies, it
will prove difficult for content owners to know whom to supply video for
fingerprinting.
Further, with no centralized system, content owners will be
distributing high-quality videos to each video-upload site employing these
151. Anderson, supra note 148.
152. Id.
153. Press Release, Concept Communications for Gracenote, Gracenote Unveils the
Most Advanced Video Identification, Recommendation, and Content Management Platform,
(Jan. 7, 2008), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS106193+07-
Jan-2008+MW20080107.
154. Press Release, Audible Magic, IBM and Audible Magic Team to Protect Video
Content: New Software Provides "Best-In-Class" Video Content Identification Services to
Prevent Piracy, (Oct. 23, 2008) available at http://www.audiblemagic.com/news/press-
releases/pr-2008-10-23.asp.
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control measures. 155 This presents problems simply dealing with the mass
of samples to be sent, but also exposes content owners to an even greater
risk of copies of the copyrighted material being available in the free
market.
2. Allowing Automatic Rejection of a Video Match Curtails Fair-
Use Freedoms
Fair users of copyrighted content already have few protections under
the DMCA. 156 While many OSPs have an appeals procedure, Section 512
compels OSPs to blindly remove anything for which OSPs receive a valid
take-down notice without checking whether the third party was making a
legal use of the material. The EFF points out that YouTube's video
identification software "can't discern whether a 'match' results from a
verbatim infringing copy, or whether it results from a short excerpt
embedded in a longer piece that includes other content."' 57 Consequently,
the EFF recommends two potential courses of action that could provide
additional protection to fair users. The EFF suggests requiring both an
audio match and a video match before blocking any content.1
58
Alternatively (or in addition), the EFF suggests adding a test that outputs
the percentage of the uploaded clip that matched the copyrighted material
in order to allow for transformative uses. 159
3. Complete Automation of the Process Removes the Most
Knowledgeable Party and Lowers Accountability
The actual copyright holder has the best access to information to
determine whether a particular bit of media infringes on the copyright
holder's copyright. 160 The copyright holder also has the most to gain from
monitoring illegal uses of the copyright. In addition, an automated process
removes the human character that acts as a check to ensure fair play. 161 The
DMCA notification requirements currently demand that the complainant
certify, under penalty of perjury, that the notice was the product of a good-
155. See Peter Burrows, Nabbing Video Pirates: Who Needs Google?, Bus. WK., Oct.
16, 2007, available at http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/oct2007
/tc20071016 876447. htm.
156. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g).
157. Fred von Lohmann, YouTube's Copyright Filter: New Hurdle for Fair Use?,




160. See discussion supra Part III.A.




faith belief.162 This requirement helps ensure that clearly legal uses of a
copyrighted work, or use of noncopyrighted work altogether, are not
arbitrarily removed. Taking the claimant and the notice out of the process
removes those checks and puts too much trust in an untested system.
D. Proper Use of Video Fingerprinting Technology
To resolve all the concerns raised by a fully automated, decentralized
system, the industry should follow some basic guidelines. These guidelines
will maintain stability while ensuring each interested party receives a
minimum level of protection.
First, it is important to view video fingerprinting technology as a
standard technical measure contemplated in Section 512(i)(1)(B). Since the
process is technological by nature, and likely will require cooperation from
OSPs, this makes perfect sense. As a standard technical control measure, a
broad consensus of copyright owners and service providers must develop
the systems to be used, or at least agree on some basic principles.
Researchers at IEEE, a common standards organization, propose a uniform
solution for video fingerprinting. 163  Uniformity will ensure equal
opportunities for OSPs to comply, while limiting the amount of
copyrighted material a content owner needs to supply to OSPs. In fact, a
uniform standard would likely permit copyright owners to generate digital
fingerprints on their own systems before uploading them to a central
database.
The system should be centralized, or have only a few central
locations, to ease the burden on content owners and to provide uniformity
in application. Content owners will provide the digital fingerprints or high-
quality videos to the centralized location rather than to each OSP. The
system should be accessible to all content providers, or at least those over a
relatively small threshold size, to promote equal protection among
copyright holders. Also, pursuant to Section 512(i)(2)(C), the system
contemplated must not impose substantial costs on OSPs or overly tax their
systems. An original purpose of the statute was to "preserve[] strong
incentives for service providers and copyright owners to cooperate to detect
and deal with copyright infringements that take place in the digital
networked environment." 164
Second, the catalyst for this added technical measure must be kept in
mind. The need for a system like this arose out of the expense of searching
162. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) (2006).
163. Sunil Lee & Chang D. Yoo, Robust Video Fingerprinting for Content-Based Video
Identification, 18 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS FOR VIDEO TECH. 983
(2008), available at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?amumber=04472177.
164. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 20 (1998).
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for infringing content that had already been removed. Accordingly, the
system should be limited to content that has already been the subject of a
DMCA take-down notice at least one time. This provision, which may
allow for some initial infringement, will keep the system from getting
overloaded with digital fingerprints for video that will never be uploaded
by a third party to an OSP. Perhaps some mechanism for scanning existing
clips after a specific key is first added to the system is appropriate to knock
out all cases of infringement on different networks and by different users.
Third, the identification software should not default to blocking the
content outright. There is still room for the DMCA take-down notice in the
new scheme. Instead of blocking the content, a match should trigger a
message to the appropriate copyright owner that a match was made, and
that the copyright owner should review the offending material and notify
the appropriate OSP through the existing take-down notification process.
Not only does this require a human check on the computer system, it also
provides for accountability. An individual must be personally responsible
for faulty notices and claims made in bad faith or where the uploaded
content simply does not match the alleged copyrighted material. This
provision will also provide some nominal protections for fair users, since
sending a take-down notice for a blatant fair use could be considered bad
faith.' 65
Some may criticize this provision since it puts the burden of
determining infringement and sending notice back on the copyright owner,
with little change with respect to the OSPs responsibilities. However, the
take-down notice is the glue that holds the entire safe-harbor provision
together. Knowledge of infringement is imputed by virtue of a take-down
notice. Vicarious liability arises when an OSP fails to exercise its right to
control infringement. However, this method seeks out infringement far
more effectively than any individual or business ever could. It allows an
analysis to take place right when the file is uploaded and, if the digital
fingerprint indicates that the file could be infringing, the copyright owner is
notified immediately-no searching the Web site required.
E. Impact on YouTube Litigation
Providing a means to mitigate copyright holders' fears while
encouraging responsible use of Internet technologies requires some
innovative thinking. However, the fundamentals of the DMCA provide a
solid framework on which to build. By adding a simple technical control
measure, the DMCA can remain current in light of new, emerging
technologies. The technical control scheme advanced herein ensures that
165. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) (2006).
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each party achieves its goal: the copyright owner gets help eliminating
repeated uploads of the same infringing content, the OSP knows exactly
how to avoid vicarious liability arising out of its "right to control"
infringement, and the fair users experience reduced negative impacts
because of the effect of the regulation.
The proposed solution focuses on identifying video fingerprinting
technology as a "standard technological control measure.' 66 Currently,
there is nothing "standard" about the array of competing standards and
procedures. Until the various content owners and prominent OSPs come
together to establish a standard, courts should not rule against innovative
OSPs. The YouTube litigation can be the perfect opportunity to promote
development of responsible technologies that protect copyright owners'
interests, limit the burden of discovering repeat instances of infringement,
and promote online innovation.
IV. EXTENDING A KNOWLEDGE REQUIREMENT ACROSS THE
ENTIRE SAFE-HARBOR PROVISION
As noted above, the DMCA, as written, provides no protection against
vicarious infringement, essentially making it inapplicable in today's online
world. Vicarious liability arises when an OSP receives a direct financial
benefit from infringing activity that it has the right and ability to control.
As the Napster court noted, a direct financial benefit arises when the
availability of infringing material acts as a draw to the service. 167 No doubt
exists that infringing material contributes to the draw for sites like
YouTube.
The question becomes whether the site has the right and ability to
control the infringement. In order to qualify for DMCA protection, an OSP
must reasonably implement a termination policy for repeat infringers. 168
Some courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have held that such a policy
imputes a duty on an OSP to search for infringing material and terminate
the users who have uploaded the content. 69 However, such a duty assumes
that the OSP knows the names of millions of copyrighted works for which
to search. It is clear that the owner of the copyright must bear some
responsibility to inform the OSP that its infringement of its copyright is
acting as a draw-and, therefore, a financial benefit-to the service.
The Napster and Veoh decisions already seemed to extend a
notification requirement to vicarious liability. When a termination policy is
166. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(B).
167. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 263-64 (9th Cir. 1996)).
168. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A).
169. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023-24.
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used as a de facto right and ability to control, something more than the
ability to search the network for material that may be infringing must be
required. It follows that the duty to police the network (exercising the right
and ability to control) should extend only to the copyrighted works of
which the OSP has been made aware. Thus, the DMCA safe harbor should
shield OSPs from liability for vicarious, as well as contributory, liability
until the OSP is made aware of the infringing content. However, instead of
simply removing the infringing file specified by a take-down notice, an
OSP now has the right and ability to control infringement of the
copyrighted work at issue. Once the OSP has been made aware that a
particular video is copyrighted, the duty to police the network should
extend to that video.
Combined with the video fingerprinting technology discussed in Part
III, the burden of limiting instances of infringement is shared among the
parties at the time they have the best ability to control it. Content owners
have the best access to knowledge and the incentive to discover and notify
OSPs of the initial infringement. The onus then shifts to OSPs, which have
a duty to police their network to keep duplicates and repeat infringements
from permeating the Internet.
V. CONCLUSION
After analyzing how courts have applied the safe harbors of the
DMCA Section 512 to various OSPs, it is obvious more clarity and stability
will benefit the long-term incentive to innovate on the Internet. Congress
enacted the DMCA as a means to foster cooperation between content
owners and OSPs to advance innovation into the digital age.
170
Unsurprisingly, very little cooperation resulted from OSPs creating
services targeted exclusively or primarily at encouraging copyright
infringement. The creators of Napster, Aimster, and Grokster intended to
promote rampant copyright infringement. However, even as services that
are more consistent with Congress' contemplation arise, content providers
continue to pursue litigation intending to shut down online services. To
realize the goals of the DMCA, and to force copyright owners into the
digital age, courts must enforce the DMCA's threshold requirements to
encourage the private sector to adapt their technologies to a rapidly
changing marketplace. Extending the knowledge requirement across the
entire safe-harbor provision encourages collaboration and provides an
incentive for OSPs to actively pursue copyright infringement on their
network.
170. S. REP. No. 105-190, supra note 52, at 20.
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Rather than pursuing expensive lawsuits aimed at shutting down
innovative services, content providers should adapt to changing market
conditions and work with OSPs to take advantage of the legal provisions
already in place to protect copyright.
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